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INTRODUCTION
Official and unofficial creditors' committees, formed to protect the
interests of creditors in connection with workouts and reorganiza-
tions, typically receive confidential information' such as internal fi-
nancial statements and projections, as well as information concern-
ing claims against the company. Creditors' committee members are
also well positioned to gauge management's reaction to restructuring
alternatives and wield significant influence in determining if and
when a company's reorganization plan is confirmed by the bank-
ruptcy court.' Thus, members of creditors' committees have access
to confidential information concerning the uncertainty and length of
the workout and reorganization process. This uncertainty causes the
securities of the distressed companies to trade at deep discounts.
Members of creditors' committees who trade on this material, non-
public information have the opportunity to make substantial profits.
Over the past several years, numerous publications have reported
1. The terms "confidential information," "inside information" and "material, nonpublic infor-
mation" are used synonymously in this Article.
2. SEC Probes Distressed Debt Trading By Creditors' Committees, BONDWEEK, Sept. 21,
1992, at 1.
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widespread insider trading by members of creditors' committees,'
and increased interest by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC" or "Commission") in ferreting out alleged abuses
by members of creditors' committees." On October 27, 1993, the
SEC settled the first insider trading case in which the relevant infor-
mation was obtained as a result of an individual's participation on a
creditors' committee. In SEC v. Baker,5 the SEC charged that
Sherman Baker, a member of the official creditors' committee in the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of Ames Department Stores
("Ames") and chairman of the board of J. Baker, Inc. ("Baker,
Inc."), sold Baker, Inc. stock after learning that the creditors' com-
mittee planned to recommend that Ames close many of the depart-
ment stores in which Baker, Inc. operated leased shoe departments.
The complaint alleged that Sherman Baker "breached fiduciary du-
ties or other duties of trust or confidence to Baker, Inc. and its
shareholders, and to the Creditors' Committee and creditors of
Ames."'
Baker is noteworthy because it is the first insider trading case
3. See Laurie P. Cohen & Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Starts Insider-Trading Probe In Junk-Bond
Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1991, at Cl (reporting that the SEC began investigations into
insider trading in junk-bond market, in response to investor concern that such trading was wide-
spread); Matthew Schifrin, Sellers Beware, FORBES, Jan. 21, 1991, at 36 (noting that inside trad-
ing by creditors' committees is widespread and subject to very little SEC regulation).
4. In September of 1992, BONDWEEK reported that the SEC was investigating "three or four
cases" of insider trading by members of creditors' committees. SEC Probes Distressed Debt Trad-
ing By Creditors' Committees, supra note 2, at 1. Alan M. Cohen, head of the securities and
commodities subcommittee of the ABA's White Collar Crime Committee said that the SEC is
"on the warpath" and "is looking to make a case." Karen Donovan, N.Y.'s SEC Targets Insider
Trading in Bankruptcy Debt, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7, 1992, at 15. The National Law Journal also
quoted William R. McLucas, the SEC's Director of Enforcement, as saying that trading by credi-
tors' committee members "is an area where there's a lot of activity. .. .There's just a growing
concern that you don't want for there to be abuses." Id. Richard Walker, head of the SEC's New
York regional office was quoted by Reuters as saying, "I think people on creditors' committees
sometimes have access to confidential information that others would not have access to. . . .It is
something the Commission has been interested in." Gail Appleson, SEC Probes Bankruptcy Cases
for Insider Trading, THE REUTERS Bus. REPORT, Sept. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, REUBUS File.
Other SEC divisions have also taken note of the trading activities of institutions with creditors'
committee membership. On August 9, 1992, Marianne Smythe, then Director of the Division of
Investment Management, warned that advisers for institutional investors must be "more vigilant"
in preventing insider trading when investing in distressed or bankrupt companies. Insider Trading
Problems May Arise for Institutional Investors Smythe Cautions, SEC Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 34, at 1295 (Aug. 21, 1992).
5. SEC. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1463 (Oct. 29, 1993).
6. SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13850, 55 SEC Docket 823 (Oct. 27, 1993).
7. SEC's Complaint at 6, SEC v. Baker, No. 93 Civ. 7398 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 26,
1993).
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involving a member of a creditors' committee who traded on infor-
mation acquired while participating on the committee.' The case
does not, however, illuminate the extent to which members of credi-
tors' committees may be liable for violating the federal securities
laws because, despite the broad allegations, the case was never tried.
Moreover, Baker's alleged unlawful activity involved trading in the
securities of his own company, trading which could have been found
to have violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws under well-established insider trading principles. This Article
seeks to resolve the more tangled question - whether a member of
a creditors' committee such as Baker would be liable under the fed-
eral securities laws" if he or she traded in the securities of the
debtor corporation.10
Part I of this Article explores the powers and functions of official
and unofficial creditors' committees. Then, Part II examines the fed-
eral securities laws and restrictions on insider trading; and Part III
addresses the imposition of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws to insider trading by members of official and unoffi-
cial creditors' committees.
This Article concludes that members of official and unofficial
creditors' committees, who purchase or sell, or tip others to purchase
or sell, securities of financially distressed or insolvent corporations
while in possession of material, nonpublic information may violate
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws pursuant to
two theories. First, committee members may owe fiduciary duties to
the class of creditors they represent, the committee itself and fellow
committee members. Members of the creditors' committees who
misappropriate material, nonpublic information in breach of their
duties to their constituents, the committee itself and other commit-
8. SEC. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1463 (Oct. 29, 1993).
9. The analysis in this Article is limited to the question of whether the two government organi-
zations charged with enforcing the federal securities laws, the SEC and the Justice Department,
may successfully prosecute insider trading by members of official and unofficial creditors' commit-
tees. Whether private litigants have standing to bring similar actions is a question beyond the
scope of this Article.
10. Some commentators have suggested that following the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, trade
claims may be characterized as securities. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 46-56 (1990)
(noting that once a Chapter 11 petition is filed, general unsecured trade debt takes on some as-
pects of a security); James D. Pendergast, Applying Federal Securities Law to the Trading in
Bankruptcy Claims, 3 F & G BANKR. L. REV. 9, 12 (1992) (stating that the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition transforms trade claims into securities because the possessor has a claim to a pay
out from the debtor's estate).
[Vol. 44:99
INSIDER TRADING
tee members and who trade on that information violate Rule lOb-5.
Second, committee members may be characterized as "temporary
insiders," and as such, are subject to the same insider trading re-
strictions as "true" insiders such as directors, officers and control-
ling shareholders.
I. FORMATION, FUNCTION AND GOVERNANCE
Official creditors' committees are empowered by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 ("the Bankruptcy Code") 1 to supervise the
reorganization of debtors and to assist in the formulation of reor-
ganization plans. The Bankruptcy Code governs the composition,
duties and responsibilities of such committees. 2
Unofficial creditors' committees, also known as creditor steering
committees, are composed of creditors, typically bondholders, who
devise and negotiate out-of-court restructuring plans with issuers.'"
Unofficial creditors' committees are formed before a company's
Chapter 1114 filing and therefore they are not supervised by the
courts. However, pursuant to Section 1102(b)(1), a pre-petition
committee may later be appointed as an official creditors' committee
if the court determines that the committee was "fairly chosen and is
representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented.' 15
11. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). The provisions of the Code became
effective on October 1, 1979.
12. The Bankruptcy Code significantly altered the function of creditors' committees from that
enumerated under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Bankruptcy Act of July 2,
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 repealed by The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991). The most significant change was the transfer of responsibility for monitoring the
debtor from bankruptcy judges to creditors' committees. See Dennis S. Meir & Theodore Brown,
Jr., Representing Creditor's Committees Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 56 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 217, 217 (1982) (stating that by enacting the code, Congress "expressed a clear
intent to limit the duties of bankruptcy judges to those of a judicial nature. This has resulted to a
great extent in the shift of the responsibility for monitoring Chapter 11 debtors to creditors' com-
mittees, and, as a result, the role of committees of unsecured creditors under the Code is far more
important than that of creditors' committees under [the Act]").
13. Peter D. Wolfson et al., Restrictions in Trading by Pre-Petition Steering Committee Mem-
bers, in HIGH-YIELD BONDS 1991: RECENT TRENDS IN WORKOUTS, EXCHANGE OFFERS, AND
BANKRUPTCY, 177, 179 (PLI Real Est. Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 376, 1991).
14. Chapter 1I of the Bankruptcy Code allows a business to reorganize as a going concern. It
provides the debtor with time to rescale its operations and to negotiate a plan of repayment that is
aacceptable to its creditors. See generally I I U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
15. Id. § 1102(b)(1). Bankruptcy Rule 2007 sets forth the test used to determine whether the
committee in existence prior to the Chapter 11 filing meets the Code's requirements of being
"fairly chosen" and "representative." 11 U.S.C. § 2007 (Supp. V 1993) (as amended April 30,
1991) (effective August 1, 1991). The rule states:
(b) Selection of Members of Committee
1994]
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A. Official Creditors' Committees
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the appointment of an official un-
secured creditors' committee is mandatory in all Chapter 11 cases;16
the Bankruptcy Code provides that "as soon as practicable after the
order for relief," the United States trustee 17 shall appoint an un-
secured creditors committee.' 8 The U.S. trustee may exercise broad
discretion when appointing members of the creditors' committee;
however, the Bankruptcy Code provides some regulation. For exam-
ple, section 1102(b)(1) states that the committee shall ordinarily
consist of persons who are willing to serve and who hold the seven
largest claims against the debtor. 9 In addition to the unsecured
creditors' committee, the U.S. trustee has the discretion to appoint
any additional committees.2 0 Section 1102(a)(2) provides that if a
party in interest makes a request, the court may order the U.S. trus-
tee to appoint additional committees of creditors, if necessary to en-
sure their adequate representation in the case." The committees
could include, among others, committees of bondholders, priority
creditors and equity security holders. 2 A committee appointed pur-
The court may find that a committee organized by unsecured creditors before the
commencement of a chapter 9 or chapter 11 case was fairly chosen if:
(1) it was selected by a majority in number and amount of claims of unsecured
creditors who may vote under § 702(a) of the Code and were present in person or
represented at a meeting of which all creditors having unsecured claims of over
$1,000 or the 100 unsecured creditors having the largest claims had at least five days
notice in writing, and of which meeting written minutes reporting the names of the
creditors present or represented and voting and the amounts of their claims were kept
and are available for inspection;
(2) all proxies voted at the meeting for the elected committee were solicited pursu-
ant to Rule 2006 and the lists and statements required by subdivision (e) thereof have
been transmitted to the United States trustee; and
(3) the organizations of the committee was in all other respects fair and proper.
Id.
16. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the appointment of creditors' committees was permissive. The
Bankruptcy Act of July 2, 1898, ch. 541, 30 stat. 544 repealed by The Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
17. Prior to the 1986 Amendments to the Code, courts appointed the members of the creditors'
committee. In order to ease the administrative duties of the courts, Congress gave the responsibil-
ity for appointing committee members to the U.S. trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988) (as stated in
historical note following § 1102).
18. Id. § 1102(a)(l).
19. The list of such persons is furnished by the debtor. See id. § 1007(a).
20. Id. § 1102(a)(l).
21. The appointment of additional committees is discretionary with the court. In re Salant
Corp., 53 B.R. 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also In re McLean Indus. Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 856-
57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
22. McLean Indus., 70 B.R. at 856-57.
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suant to section 1102(a)(2) has the same rights and duties as se-
cured committees appointed pursuant to section 1102(a)(1). 2 3
The Bankruptcy Code enumerates the powers and duties en-
trusted to creditors' committees.24 Specifically, section 1103(c)(1)
reveals that the role of the creditors' committee is advisory or con-
sultative rather than controlling.2 5 Section 1103(c)(2) allows credi-
tors' committees to investigate the acts, conduct and financial affairs
of the debtor.26 The committee's investigatory power is expansive; it
includes all matters relevant to the case or to the formulation of the
reorganization plan. 7
Section 1103(c)(3) further authorizes official creditors' commit-
tees to participate in the formulation of a reorganization plan.2 8 A
committee is expressly empowered to advise its constituency about
the merits of any proposed plan.2 9 After the debtor's statutorily de-
fined period to file a plan elapses,30 "any party in interest," includ-
23. In re Evans Products Co., 58 B.R. 572, 575 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
24. Section 1103(c), states:
A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may - (1) consult with the
trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance
of such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a
plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by such commit-
tee of such committee's determination as to any plan formulated, and collect and file
with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section 1104 of this title;
and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988).
25. Id. § 1103(c)(1).
26. Id. § 1103(c)(2).
27. Marta G. Andrews, The Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BANK.
DEV. J. 247, 251 (1985). Among other things, courts have determined that a thorough investiga-
tion is crucial to the committee's ability to make an informed decision about the feasibility of a
reorganization plan. See In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813, 819-20 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988) (permitting creditors' committee to have access to confidential information to enable com-
mittee to evaluate and advise its constituency on potential sale of debtor's assets); see also In re
Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 272, 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983)(authorizing creditors' commit-
tee to fully investigate the debtor and its business affairs).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1988). See In re Johns-Manville Corp. v. Doan, 26 B.R. 919, 925
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that creditors' committees are vested with "a wide and important
array of authority indicating the intent to create a significant and central role for committees in
carrying out a reorganization").
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1988).
30. Only the debtor may file a plan during the first 120 days after the entry of the order for
relief, unless the court orders a shorter period. Id. § 1121(b).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ing the creditors' committee, may file a reorganization plan.8 1 Fur-
thermore, a committee can be influential in negotiating the terms of
any proposed plan - rejection by a committee will often prevent a
plan from being accepted. 2
B. Creditor Steering Committees
In contrast to official creditors' committees in bankruptcy cases,
creditor steering committees (unofficial creditors' committees) are
not formed pursuant to statute; they have no powers or responsibili-
ties except those that they assume themselves or those that they are
given by others.33 Further, the very process in which they are func-
tioning - the workout - is an "entirely consensual one that has no
governmental sanction or oversight." ' However, creditor steering
committees may, by mutual assent, adopt bylaws to govern the com-
mittee's actions and relationship with other parties.
II. INSIDER TRADING
A. Statutory Authority
The primary weapon in the SEC's battle against insider trading is
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").3 Developed as a catchall provision to prevent fraudulent
practices,3 6 section 10(b) prohibits the use "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and reg-
31. Id. § 1121(c).
32. Peter C. Blain & David A. Erne, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and Duties, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 491
(1984).
33. Wolfson, supra note 13, at 177.
34. Mark D. Brodsky et al., Restrictions on Trading By Creditor Steering Committee Mem-
bers During Out of Court Restructurings, in HIGH YIELD BONDS 1990; WORKOUTS, EXCHANGE
OFFERS, AND BANKRUPTCY, 591, 610 (PLI Real Est. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 591,
Nov. 1990); see generally Lillian E. Kramer & Richard Paige, Consensual Workouts-Bankruptcy
Alternatives for the 1990s?, in BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW, (ALI-ABA Course of
Study Handbook Series No. 419, 1994).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). In 1980, the Commission promulgated Rule 14e-3. Rule 14e-
3(a) provides that any person who obtains inside information regarding a tender offer from either
the offeror or the target must either disclose the information or abstain from trading. Rule 14e-3
does not require the Commission to prove that the tender offer information was obtained pursuant
to a breach of a fiduciary duty. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994)(pursuant to Section 14(e) of the
1933 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e) (1988)).
36. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
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ulations as the Commission may prescribe. '37 Pursuant to this sec-
tion, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5. 8
Neither section 10(b) nor its legislative history specifically state
whether or not a corporate insider's failure to disclose inside infor-
mation prior to trading is actionable under the statute.3 9 Further,
the Commission did not address this issue when it promulgated Rule
lOb-5 in 1942.40 Therefore, it is necessary to examine administrative
and federal court decisions to determine the effects of an individ-
ual's failure to disclose material, nonpublic information.41 These de-
cisions may be divided into two main theories: the classical theory
42
and the misappropriation theory.43
B. Judicial Interpretation
1. Classical Theory
The classical theory generally provides that for a duty to disclose
to exist, there must be a fiduciary relationship between a corporate
insider and a stockholder.44 This theory of insider trading analysis is
illustrated in several cases. First, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,45
the Commission imposed an affirmative duty on corporate insiders
- traditionally, officers, directors and controlling stockholders - to
disclose all material, nonpublic information or abstain from trad-
ing.4" The obligation to disclose information to shareholders or ab-
stain from trading arose from: 1) "the existence of a relationship
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Rule lob-5 provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] ...
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
39. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
40. See Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (May 21, 1942).
41. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226.
42. For a discussion of decisions following the classical theory, see infra notes 44-67 and ac-
companying text.
43. For a discussion of decisions following the misappropriation theory, see infra notes 68-91
and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
45. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
46. Id. at 911.
1994]
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giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose . . . and 2) the inherent un-
fairness when a party takes advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. '47
In Chiarella v. United States,4 8 the Supreme Court found no gen-
eral duty to disclose material, nonpublic information before trading
on the information.49 The Court held that a duty to disclose under
section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of material,
nonpublic information;50 instead, the duty springs from the existence
of a fiduciary relationship between corporate insiders and the stock-
holders of the corporation.'
In Chiarella, a "markup man" employed at a financial printing
company gleaned the identity of takeover targets and traded on the
information. 2 Because Chiarella had no prior relationship with the
target company shareholders, was not a corporate insider in the tar-
get company, and did not receive confidential information from the
target company, the Supreme Court found that he did not owe a
duty to the target company shareholders.5 In his opinion, Justice
Powell acknowledged that section 10(b) is a catchall provision, but
noted that "what it catches must be fraud. 54 He further stated,
"[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there
can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."55
Three years later, the Supreme Court addressed the obligations of
"tippees" - recipients of material, nonpublic information. In Dirks
47. Id. at 912; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)
(reaffirming the Commission's view that a fiduciary's failure to disclose confidential information
was actionable under section 10(b)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
48. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 227-35.
52. Since speculation of an upcoming tender offer will invariably cause the target company's
stock price to rise, information about proposed offers is closely guarded prior to the public an-
nouncement. It is common for firms to leave blanks for the name of the target and masque specif-
ics about the entity. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 702 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
53. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-233 ("He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was
not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.").
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id. Further, the court specifically rejected the need for "equality of information" which
required those in the market with superior information about a stock to disclose or refrain from
trading on the information. Id. at 232-33.
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v. SEC, 6 Dirks, an investment analyst for a broker-dealer firm, was
told by Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America
("Equity Funding"), that Equity Funding's assets were vastly over-
stated because of fraudulent practices.57 Secrist revealed the infor-
mation to Dirks in hopes that Dirks would expose the fraudulent
activity.58 Dirks conducted an investigation which partially verified
Secrist's statements. During his investigation, Dirks passed his find-
ings on to investors and customers, some of whom subsequently sold
Equity Funding securities.5  After the fraud was fully exposed, the
SEC, based on the findings of an administrative law judge that
Dirks had aided and abetted violation of the federal securities laws,
censured Dirks for informing investors and customers of his find-
ings.6 0 Dirks appealed the ruling to the court of appeals, which af-
firmed the SEC's ruling, and then went to the Supreme Court,
which reversed the finding of the administrative law judge."
In Dirks, the Court held that a tippee's duty to disclose informa-
tion or abstain from trading is derivative from that of an insider's
duty:62
[a] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information
to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.s
The Court further stated that in determining whether or not an
insider breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation by disclosing
information to a tippee, courts must analyze the insider's purpose in
disclosing information to the tippee.6 4 Specifically, courts must con-
sider "whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal ben-
efit from the disclosure, such as pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future earnings. 65 Additionally, the
Court found that "[t] he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation
of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of
56. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
57. Id. at 649.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 651-52.
61. Id. at 652.
62. Id. at 659.
63. Id. at 660.
64. Id. at 662.
65. Id. at 663.
1994]
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confidential information to a trading relative or friend."6 Finally,
the Supreme Court concluded that Dirks had no duty to abstain
from the use of inside information that he obtained since the corpo-
rate insiders, motivated by a desire to expose fraud, received no
monetary or personal benefit from revealing the information, nor
was there a gift of information to Dirks.67 Thus, the classical theory
is based on the premise that a duty to disclose must exist and be
breached before an individual may be held liable.
2. Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory is the government's most flexible
means of combatting insider trading.6 8 Generally, the theory pro-
vides that there is a Rule lOb-5 violation when a person misappro-
priates material, nonpublic information in breach of a duty arising
out of a relationship of trust and confidence and trades while in pos-
session of that information. The person need not owe any duties to
the shareholders of the traded stock.6 9
The misappropriation theory first received judicial recognition in
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella.7 0 Chief Justice Burger
remarked that Chiarella "misappropriated - stole to put it bluntly
- valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence. 1  Chief Justice Burger suggested the limitless proposi-
tion that an absolute duty to disclose information or refrain from
trading arises when a person has "misappropriated" inside
66. Id. at 664.
67. Id. at 667.
68. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider Trad-
ing in Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAW. 187, 242 (1993).
69. ,SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The misappropriation theory focuses
not on the insider's fiduciary duty to the issuing company or its shareholders, but on whether the
insider breached a fiduciary duty to any lawful possessor of material non-public information.").
70. The government advanced the "misappropriation theory" to the Court in Chiarella - ar-
guing that Chiarella breached a duty to the acquiring company when he traded on information
entrusted to him by his employer. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). However,
Justice Powell writing for the majority, declined to address the theory/argument because it was
not raised at trial and, accordingly, not submitted to the jury. Id. at 236. However, a concurring
opinion and both dissenting opinions suggested that "had the misappropriation theory been
presented to the jury and argued to the Court, the conviction might have been affirmed." Id. at
238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 245-246 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); accord Cherif 933 F.2d at 409-10 (noting that the Supreme Court "had declined
to comment on the viability of the misappropriation theory" but that the theory had nonetheless
been adhered to by "numerous circuit and district courts despite the lack of explicit approval by
the Supreme Court").
71. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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information. 2
In U.S. v. Newman"3 the Second Circuit adopted Burger's misap-
propriation theory in name only.74 Although the Second Circuit re-
ferred to Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella, it did not em-
brace his expansive view of the theory.7 5 In Newman, the Second
Circuit reversed the dismissal of an indictment charging employees
of Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb, investment banking firms, with
misappropriating information concerning the identity of merger and
acquisition targets and with trading on the basis of the informa-
tion.7 6 The court held that the breach of fiduciary duties owed by
the alleged inside traders to their employer 7 could support a Rule
lOb-5 conviction, even in the absence of any duties owed by the
company whose shares the inside traders bought.7 8 The Second Cir-
cuit found that the defendants' actions "sull[ied] the reputations of
[the firms] as safe repositories of client confidences . . . and de-
frauded those employers as surely as if they took their money.
Following Newman, the Second Circuit decided SEC v.
Materia.8 ° Materia, like Chiarella, involved a financial printing firm
employee who purchased the securities of takeover targets. In
Materia, the SEC alleged that Materia, the employee, perpetrated a
fraud on his employer when he misappropriated material, nonpublic
information.81 The Second Circuit found that by misappropriating
confidential information from his employer and trading on the infor-
mation to his own advantage, Materia violated section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5. 81 The court stated that "[b]y purloining and trading on
72. Id. at 240; see also SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Burger's
dissent in Chiarella).
73. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
74. SEC v. Clark, 699 F.Supp. 839, 843 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (stating that the Second Circuit
adopted Burger's view "in name but the application has been modified in order to make it more
specific and consistent), affd, SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984))
75. Clark, 915 F.2d at 445. Clark cites Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir.
1983) which describes Burger's view of the misappropriation theory as "contrary to the holdings
in Chiarella and Dirks."). Id. at 445 n. 8.
76. Moss, 719 F.2d at 14.
77. The Second Circuit also stated that Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb's clients were
"wronged" since an increase in purchases of the target companies securities drives up the price of
the targets company's shares and the price ultimately paid by the buyer. Id. at 17-18.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 17.
80. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 202.
82. Id. at 203.
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confidences entrusted to [the printer], it cannot be gainsaid that
Materia undermined his employer's integrity."83 The Second Circuit
underscored that Materia's actions fit neatly within the "fraud or
deceit" language of the rule, 4 concluding that section 10(b) is not
"aimed solely at the eradication of fraudulent trading by corporate
insiders." 85
In 1987, the Supreme Court finally addressed the validity of the
misappropriation theory. A 4-4 vote in Carpenter v. United States86
affirmed the conviction of a Wall Street Journal writer who, with
the aid of accomplices, traded on information obtained for and used
in his upcoming columns. The column, "Heard on the Street,"
tended to effect the price of any stock analyzed in it.8 7 The colum-
nist traded on the probable market impact of the information. 8 Af-
ter characterizing the contents of the column as the Journal's confi-
dential information,89 the Court held that the "deliberate breach of
Winans' [the columnist] duty of confidentiality and concealment of
the scheme was a fraud and deceit on the Journal." 90 Since Carpen-
ter, and despite its 4-4 vote, the misappropriation theory has been
widely applied in various circuits.91
83. Id. at 202.
84. Id. at 201.
85. Id.
86. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
87. Id. at 22.
88. Id. at 23.
89. Id. at 26-27.
90. Id. at 24. Carpenter is unique because the source of the information, the Wall Street Jour-
nal, neither traded in the securities nor received its information from corporate clients which in-
tended to trade in the securities. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing
the uniqueness of the Carpenter case).
91. The misappropriation theory has been applied in the following circuits:
Second Circuit
United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying the misappropriation theory to
an attorney who traded on confidential information learned at law firm), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1040 (1989); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affid, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying the misappropriation theory to a psychiatrist who traded on nonpublic
information learned from patient, and observing that "[t]he underlying rationale of the misappro-
priation theory is that a person who receives secret business information from another because of
an established relationship of trust and confidence between them has a duty to keep the informa-
tion confidential"); United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 710 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(applying theory to a corporate insider); SEC v. Tome, 638 F.Supp. 596, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("The common-sense notion underlying the misappropriation theory is that one who misappropri-
ates valuable information for his own benefit, in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and
confidence, has surely committed fraud on the person or entity to whom that duty is owed."),
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a. Congressional Support
Members of the United States Congress have also endorsed the
misappropriation theory. The theory is expressly addressed in dis-
cussions of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ("ITSA")
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 ("ITSFEA").92
affid, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(recognizing that Newman "gave legal effect to the commonsensical view that trading on the basis
of improperly obtained information is fundamentally unfair, and that distinctions premised on the
source of the information undermine the prophylactic intent of the securities laws").
Third Circuit
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that an insider violates the
federal securities laws "when he uses insider information in violation of the fiduciary duty owed to
the corporation to which he owes a duty of confidentiality."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
Seventh Circuit
SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991). Cherif argued that no fiduciary duty existed be-
tween him and his former employer at any time he obtained material, nonpublic information from
the offices of his former employer. The court held that "[n]otwithstanding the contractual agree-
ment, Cherif was bound by a broader common law duty. This common law duty obligates an
employee to protect any confidential information entrusted to him by his employer during his
employment." Id. at 411.
Ninth Circuit
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the misappropriation theory to president of
subsidiary, who, based on conversations with insiders and knowledge of the health care industry,
determined that the parent of the subsidiary planned to make a major acquisition and traded on
the basis of the information). The court concluded, "by becoming part of a fiduciary or similar
relationship, an individual is implicitly stating that she will not divulge or use to her own advan-
tage information entrusted to her in the utmost confidence. She deceives the other party by play-
ing the role of the trustworthy employee or agent; she defrauds it by actually using the stolen
information to its detriment." Id. at 448.
District courts in other circuits have also adopted the misappropriation theory:
SEC v. Callahan, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,609 at 97,848 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (imposing liability for misappropriation of information by an employee of R.R. Donnelly,
the company that prints the upcoming issues of BusinessWeek or BusinessWeek's "Inside Wall
Street" column); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (concluding that
"under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may
become fiduciaries of the shareholders"); SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Kan. 1990) (im-
posing federal securities fraud liability based on misappropriation theory to partner in investment
company even though partner had no direct fiduciary relationship to the issuing company other
than partnership agreement with consulting firm).
92. The Second Circuit in Carpenter, found Congress' statements accompanying ITSA "per-
suasive" in determining Congressional intent in connection with restrictions on insider trading
imposed by the Exchange Act. 791 F.2d at 1030 (citing Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) which construed section 10(b) in light of the provisions and legisla-
tive history of ITSA); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, (1969)
(stating that subsequent legislation declaring the intent of the earlier statute is "entitled to great
weight in [prior] statutory construction"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 782 F.2d
322, 324 n.3 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (noting persuasiveness of subsequent legislative history
as to meaning of prior law). "The use of subsequent legislative history is especially appropriate
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In enacting the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, which
amended certain provisions of the Exchange Act of 1934,13 Con-
gress noted that the intent of the Exchange Act was to condemn all
manipulative or deceptive trading "whether the information about a
corporation or its securities originates from inside or outside the cor-
poration."94 The basis for this view was that "the abuses sought to
be remedied [by section 10(b)] were not limited to actions of corpo-
rate insiders and large shareholders."95
The House Report further stated that "deceitful misappropriation
of confidential information by a fiduciary" has consistently been
held to be unlawful in various areas of the law, and that, "Congress
has not sanctioned a less rigorous code of conduct under the federal
securities laws."" In 1988, the House Committee reporting on IT-
SFEA commented that the "type of security fraud" for which the
misappropriation theory addressed "should be encompassed within
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."97 Commenting on Congress' willing-
ness to include the misappropriation theory in the net of items en-
snared by Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the court of appeals in
Carpenter stated:
Clearly, Congress has understood its predecessors to have delineated illegal
conduct along the lines not simply of relationships to corporations and duties
arising thereunder, as developed by the line of cases through Cady, Roberts
and Dirks.1s
The court continued:
where, as here, the original history is limited." Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1030 (citing Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 n.13 (1977) which noted the lack of legislative history on
section 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-206 (1976) (concluding that the
legislative history of the Exchange Act does not provide an explicit explanation of the standard of
liability).
93. H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2274, 2277.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2276.
96. H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2278. But see Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1493,
1452-53 (1994) (declining to find that Congress acquiesced to judicial interpretations of section
§10(b) as including aiding and abetting liability, when it did not address the issue when it
amended the securities laws). The Supreme Court stated, "It does not follow ... that Congress'
failure to overturn a statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is 'impossible to
assert with any degree of assurance that Congressional failure to act represents affirmative Con-
gressional approval of the [courts'] statutory interpretation . ..' " Id. at 1453.
97. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing, H.R.Rep. No. 910, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6047).
98. Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1986).
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Rather, Congress apparently has sought to proscribe as well trading on ma-
terial, nonpublic information obtained not through skill but through a vari-
ety of "deceptive" practices, unlawful acts which we term
"misappropriation.""
b. United States v. Chestman'00
United States v. Chestman'01 placed some limitations on the gov-
ernment's use of the misappropriation theory. 10 2 In Chestman, the
government alleged that Robert Chestman obtained material, non-
public information from a client who had obtained the information
in breach of a relationship of trust and confidence owed to his wife
and her family. 0 8 In an en banc decision, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the relationship of husband and wife does not,
in itself, create a fiduciary duty sufficient to establish criminal liabil-
ity under the misappropriation theory.10 4 The court stated that the
legal standard for establishing a fiduciary relationship is "reliance,
and de facto control and dominance.' 0 5 The court found that a fi-
duciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person
with confidential information, and marriage does not, without more,
create a fiduciary relationship.' 0
The ramifications of Chestman are not entirely discernable at this
point. The decision may simply rebuke any presumption that the
marital relationship constitutes a fiduciary relationship, and thus
have limited impact. 10 7 On the other hand, some commentators ar-
99. Id. at 1031 (citing Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liabil-
ity for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 106 n.33 (1984)). See also
ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of
Insider Trading-Part I; Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 235-37, 253-63, 270-71 (1985).
100. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
101. Id.
102. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments, supra note 68, at 39.
103. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555-56.
104. Id. at 568.
105. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982)). "The relation exists
when confidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the
other." Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (N.Y. Civ.Ct. 1972),
afid, 357 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App.Div. 1976)).
106. Id. at 568-69.
107. SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating, "the Court reads the
Chestman opinion not as setting forth a rigid checklist but as a general characterization of a type
of relationship in which it is appropriate to impose the responsibilities associated with a fiduciary
association"); U.S. v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to dismiss an
indictment based on the Chestman decision).
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gue that the decision indicates that there will be fewer relationships
of "trust and confidence," the breach of which is sufficient to serve
as a basis for application of the misappropriation theory. 0 8 Never-
theless, the Chestman decision does not affect the government's abil-
ity to use the misappropriation theory where a fiduciary relationship
is definitively established.
III. IMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS TO INSIDER
TRADING BY MEMBERS OF CREDITORS' COMMITTEES
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duties Owed by Creditors' Committee
Members to Their Constituents, the Committee and Other
Committee Members
Members of official creditors' committees and creditor steering
committees owe fiduciary duties or other duties of trust and confi-
dence to the class of creditors they represent (their "constituents"),
the committee itself and fellow committee members. Committee
members who breach these duties by fraudulently misappropriating
confidential information violate Rule lOb-5.
1. Official Creditors' Committees
It is a well-settled rule that official creditors' committees owe fi-
duciary duties to those they represent. 09 As fiduciaries, members of
108. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments, supra note 68, at 39.
109. See Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941); see also Magruder
v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 119 (1914) (holding that trustee breached his fiduciary duties when he
invested estate funds to make a personal profit for himself); In re Bohack Corp. v. Gulf W. Indus.
Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that creditor's committee represents the interest
of all creditors and must carry out its fiduciary duty so as to safeguard the rights of the minority
as well as the majority of creditors); In re Reynolds Investing Co., 130 F.2d 60, 61 (3d Cir. 1942)
(holding that one who purchases or sells claims against or stock of the debtor while acting in a
representative capacity is not entitled to compensation); In re Mountain States Power Co., 118
F.2d 405, 407 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that one who becomes a member and chairman of preferred
stockholder committee of a corporation undergoing reorganization assumes a fiduciary duty to-
ward such stockholders whom they represent); In re Realty Assoc. Sec. Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1008,
1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1944) affid, 156 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (granting disqualification of members
of Bondholders' Directors Committee because members of committee had served as directors of
debtor and thus, fiduciary duty to bondholder-creditors was jeopardized); In re First Republicbank
Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) ("A member of creditor's committee owes a
fiduciary duty to all creditors represented by the committee."), In re Grant Broadcasting of Phila.
Inc., 71 B.R. 655, 661-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) ("the members of a Creditors' Committee have
a fiduciary duty to represent the interests of all creditors ...."); In re Mesta Machine Co., 67
B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) ("The Supreme Court has unequivocally found that credi-
tors' committees and counsel are fiduciaries."); In re REA Holding Corp. v. Air Canada, 8 B.R.
75, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (sanctioning members of creditors' committees for breaching their
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official committees are bound by the "whole body of law imposing
the most rigorous responsibilities for fair dealing."" Committee
members are representatives of all of the creditors in their class, and
must pursue their statutory function for the benefit of their constitu-
ency with an undivided loyalty."' Committee members must also
vigilantly avoid conflicts of interest," 2 and they may not use their
status to further their own interests at the expense of other
creditors."'
The obligations of members of creditors' committees to their con-
stituents was first enunciated in Woods v. City Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co." 4 In Woods, the Supreme Court denied compensation to
bondholder committee members because, inter alia, two of the five
members of a bondholders committee were officers or employees of
one of the principal underwriters of the bonds and served as the
"fiduciary" duties); see generally Andrew DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code - A Primer, 55 Am. BANKR. L.J. 43 (1981); Chauncey H. Levy, Creditors' Commit-
tees and Their Responsibilities, 74 COMM. L.J. 355 (1969).
110. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 213 (1945).
111. Id. at 213 ("They cannot avail themselves of the statutory privilege of litigating for the
interest of a class and then shake off their self-assumed responsibilities to others by a simple
announcement that henceforth they will trade in the rights of others for their own aggrandize-
ment."); In re Mesta Machine Co., 67 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1986) ("As fiduciaries,
counsel and committee members have obligations of fidelity, undivided loyalty and impartial ser-
vice in the interest of the creditors they represent.").
112. See American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 144 (1940)
("Where it does not affirmatively appear that full and complete disclosure of the fiscal agent's
interests was made to the bondholders when their assents were solicited, it cannot be said that
those assents were fairly obtained."); Bohack Corp., 607 F.2d at 262-63 (finding the disqualifica-
tion of special counsel for the debtor in possession proper wherein the senior partner had close
personal and business ties with the chairmen of the board of directors); Grant Broadcasting, 71
B.R. at 662-63 (holding that law firm representing unsecured program creditors was representing
interest adverse to at least some of debtor's other creditors, and therefore was ineligible to be
appointed counsel for creditor's committee); In re Penn-Dixie Indust., Inc., 9 B.R. 941, 944
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a corporation's membership on reorganization committee
was improper where corporation was one of debtor's major stockholders).
113. See e.g., In re Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 34 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
(noting that in order for a committee member to purchase assets of the estate, there must be a full
disclosure to the court and to all interested parties); In re Johns-Manville, 26 B.R. 919 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (sanctioning committee member who continued a pre-petition lawsuit against the
debtor on behalf of a private client); see also In re Enduro Stainless, Inc., 59 B.R. 603, 605
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (stating that the "union may not act through the committee to further
only its self-interests"). Cf. Magruder, 235 U.S. at 119 (stating that "[i]t is a well-settled rule
that a trustee can make no profit out of his trust. The rule in such cases springs from his duty to
protect the interests of the estate, and not to permit his personal interest to in any way conflict
with his duty to that respect. The intention is to provide against any possible selfish interest exer-
cising an influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is owing in a
fiduciary capacity").
114' 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
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indenture trustees. 5 The Court held that this created a conflict of
interest for these two committee members," 6 and explained:
It is no answer to say that fraud or unfairness were not shown to have re-
sulted . . . . IT]he incidence of a particular conflict of interest can seldom
be measured with any degree of certainty . . . . Where an actual conflict of
interest exists no more need be shown in this type of case to support a denial
of compensation.
1 1 7
In Woods, the Supreme Court emphasized the duties of creditors'
committee members by referring to Judge Cardozo's opinion in
Meinhard v. Salmon," 8 wherein Cardozo stated:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden by those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior.'1
In another important case, In re Johns-Manville Corp.,'20 the
bankruptcy court sanctioned an attorney who served as a member of
a creditors' committee for continuing a pre-petition lawsuit against
the debtor on behalf of his client without first securing relief from
an automatic stay.'21 Stating that the interests- of one claimant can
diverge from the entire class of claimants, the court found that the
attorney's actions in pursuing the lawsuit jeopardized his representa-
tion of other claimants.' 2  The court enumerated the fiduciary duties
115. Id. at 265-67.
116. Although Woods was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the creditors' committee mem-
ber's duties have not been altered by the Bankruptcy Code. See DeNatale, supra note 109, at 56-
58.
117. Woods, 312 U.S. at 268.
118. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
119. Id. at 546.
120. 26 B.R. 919 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 926. The court also stated, "(W]here a committee representative or agent seeks to
represent or advance the interest of an individual member of a competing class of creditors or
various interests or groups whose purposes and desires are dissimilar, this fiduciary is in breach of
his duty of loyal and disinterested service." Id. at 925.
Courts have not tolerated conflicts of interests by members of creditors' committees. See Woods
v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); American United Mut. Life Ins., Co, v.
City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940); Bohack Corp. v. Gulf W. Indus. Inc., 607 F.2d 258 (2d
Cir. 1979); In re Grant Broadcasting of Phila. Inc., 71 B.R. 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 B.R. 941 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see In re Plant Specialties, Inc.,
59 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (approving the appointment of a representative of the debtor's
competitor to the creditors' committee despite the debtor's objection that such an appointment
would create an impermissible conflict of interest between the creditor's fiduciary duties to its
constituent creditors and its individual self-interest).
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of creditors' committee members as follows:
In the case of reorganization committees, these fiduciary duties are crucial
because of the importance of committees. Reorganization committees are
the primary negotiating bodies for the plan of reorganization. They re-
present those classes of creditors from which they are selected. They also
provide supervision of the debtor and execute an oversight function in pro-
tecting their constituent's interests. . . . Accordingly, the individuals consti-
tuting a committee should be honest, loyal, trustworthy and without conflict-
ing interests, and with undivided loyalty and allegiance to their
constituents. . . . Conflicts of interest on the part of representative persons
or committees are thus not be [sic] tolerated.123
The court specifically denounced the misappropriation of confi-
dential information by committee members for their own private
use. The court stated:
[committee members have] access to all sorts of confidential information
regarding, inter alia, the details of proposed reorganization plans and the
debtor-in-possession's operations . . . which information is not intended to
be used in fostering the rights of private litigants outside the context of pro-
tecting these creditors as a group in these bankruptcy proceedings. This con-
fidential position should not be so misused by [committee members]. Indeed,
it may be viewed that in this regard, [the attorney] is using his fiduciary
capacity to foster his own self interest as a private attorney, a breach of
loyalty which is to be condemned.1
24
The context in which the above statement appeared in the court's
opinion indicates that committee members who misappropriate cor-
porate information for private use breach duties owed to the class
they represent.125
The obligations and duties of creditors' committee members were
further discussed in In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc.12 In Tucker
Freight, an unsecured creditor sued individual members of the cred-
itors' committee alleging that the members made false and mislead-
ing statements in the committee's letter to its constituents which
recommended that the creditors reject the debtor's plan of reorgani-
zation. 27 The unsecured creditor charged that the committee mem-
bers engaged in a "fraudulent scheme" in violation of their fiduciary
123. Johns-Manville, 26 B.R. at 925 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 926.
125. The court's opinion principally addressed obligations owed by committee members to their
constituents.
126. 62 B.R. 213 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986). Like Woods, Tucker Freight was decided under
the Bankruptcy Code. See supra notes 114-119 (discussing Woods).
127. Tucker Freight, 62 B.R. at 215.
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duties and the Exchange Act. 128 In response, the committee mem-
bers asserted that under section 1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,
committee members have absolute immunity for actions they took
while serving on the committee . 29 Acknowledging that section
1103(c) may indeed include an implicit grant of limited immunity,
the Tucker court nevertheless determined that section 1103(c) im-
poses a concurrent obligation which:
[a]t a minimum . . requires that the committee's determinations must be
honestly arrived at, and, to the greatest degree possible, also accurate and
correct. For a Creditors' Committee to urge rejection of a plan for reasons
they knew, or would have known but for their recklessness, to be false would
violate this duty and deprive them of any limited immunity they might oth-
erwise hold under Section 1103(c)(3). "0
In addition to duties owed to the their constituents, committee
members may also have fiduciary duties to the committee itself and
other committee members. For instance, in SEC v. Baker " ' the
SEC charged that Sherman Baker breached fiduciary duties or
other duties of trust or confidence to, inter alia, the creditors' com-
mittee.8 2 The misappropriation of confidential information by a
committee member would undoubtedly soil the reputation of the
committee and reflect poorly on fellow committee members.'3 3 As a
result, the misappropriation would harm the ability of the commit-
tee to function as a cohesive group, and disrupt the ability of the
debtor and the committee to devise a plan of reorganization.
Members of creditors' committees who misappropriate material,
nonpublic information in breach of their duties to their constituents,
the committee and other committee members and who trade on that
information, violate Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory.
The members would be liable regardless of whether they owed any
duties to the shareholders of the traded securities." Liability is pre-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 216.
130. Id.
131. SEC. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1463 (Oct. 29, 1993). For a discussion of Baker,
see supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
132. SEC's Complaint at 6, SEC v. Baker, No. 93 Civ. 7398 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 26,
1993); see supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
133. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) ("By sullying the reputa-
tions of [their] employers as safe repositories of client confidences, appellee and his cohorts de-
frauded their employers as surely as if they took their money."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
134. See id.
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mised on the fact that there is a relationship of trust and confidence
between the committee members and their constituents, the commit-
tee itself and the other committee members. 13 5 Trading on confiden-
tial information received as a result of membership on the commit-
tee exploits the relationship of trust and confidence. As the district
court observed in SEC. v. Tome:1 36
The common-sense notion underlying the misappropriation theory is that
one who misappropriates valuable information for his own benefit, in breach
of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence, has surely committed
fraud on the person or entity to whom that duty is owed. 18 7
In Tome, as well as in other cases that have adopted the misap-
propriation theory,138 the wrongdoer was found to have breached the
duty of confidentiality owed to the source of the information. How-
ever, this breach is not the only circumstance when liability may be
imposed under the misappropriation theory. Liability may also be
imposed when, as in the case of committee members, persons owe
duties of confidentiality, as a result of their status or employment, to
someone other than the source of the information. As observed by
the court in SEC v. Musella,3 9 "Newman gave legal effect to the
commonsensical view that trading on the basis of improperly ob-
tained information is fundamentally unfair, and that distinctions
premised on the source of the information undermine the prophylac-
tic intent of the securities laws. ' 40
In SEC v. Material4 an employee of a financial printer misap-
propriated and traded on confidential information regarding pro-
posed tender offers by the printer's corporate clients. The court
found that the employee had breached a duty to and committed a
fraud upon its employer, the printing firm, even though the source
of the confidential information was the printer's corporate clients.
135. As temporary insiders, committee members may also have a relationship of trust and con-
fidence with the debtor corporation. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. This relationship
may arise out of an expressed confidentiality agreement or may otherwise be established by the
nature of the dealings between the committee and the corporation. See infra notes 225-26 and
accompanying text. Exploitation of that relationship may also be grounds for finding a violation of
Rule lob-5 under the misappropriation theory. See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
136. 638 F.Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
137. Id. at 599.
138. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 601 F.
Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985).
139. 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Likewise, in Newman14 2 confidential tender offer information had
been entrusted to the investment banking firm's corporate clients.
The employees of the investment banking firms and their accom-
plices who traded on the information were found to have breached
confidences and defrauded the investment banking firms, as well as
the corporate clients. 4  In addition, in Carpenter," the Supreme
Court left undisturbed the conviction of Winans and his accomplices
who traded on information contained in Winans' upcoming column
even though the party to whom Winans owed a fiduciary duty, the
Wall Street Journal, did not provide or impart confidential informa-
tion to him.14 5
2. Creditor Steering Committees
Since creditor steering committees are formed by agreement
rather than statute, some commentators have suggested that mem-
bers of steering committees do not have fiduciary duties to their con-
stituent class (holders of the same class of securities that are not
members of the steering committee). 4 6 Prior to the passage of the
Bankruptcy Code, the formation and governance of creditors' com-
mittees was not dictated by statute. Nevertheless, pre-Code credi-
tors' committee members were found to be fiduciaries to their con-
stituent class. 47 By analogy, it can be argued that creditor steering
142. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
143. Id. at 15.
144. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
145. Id. at 28.
146. See, e.g., Brodsky et al., supra note 34 at 601, ("Committee members, as creditors of the
company, do not have a fiduciary duty to the company and do not assume one merely by entering
into negotiations . . . [T]emporary insider status as to such information (as emanating from the
company] should not automatically apply to information generated by the committee itself.") The
authors posture that "where it is understood by bondholders at large that steering committee
members are returning their freedom to trade, committee members should not be construed as
assuming a fiduciary duty to disclose their positions before trading." Id. Similarly, the authors
contend that "information about negotiating positions of other creditors of the company should
not be inside information ...absent an undertaking to keep the information confidential. Id.
147. See Young v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945) (finding that members of a reorganization
committee had a fiduciary duty to all members in their class of stock; "at the very least they owed
them an obligation to act in good faith"); see also In re Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Corp., 136 F.2d 3
(3d Cir. 1943). In Cosgrove-Meehan, the Third Circuit upheld the trial court's denial of a com-
pensation and reimbursement claim by a member of the pre- and post-petition bondholder's com-
mittee that during the pre-petition phase traded in the debtor's bonds. Id. at 6. The court con-
cluded that the committee member served as a fiduciary during both phases, stating:
[The committee member] makes no attempt to sever his services as a committee
member prior to the reorganization proceeding from the services performed by him in
like capacity after the institution of that proceeding. Nor can we perceive how he
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committee members act as fiduciaries to their constituent class.
There is some question, however, as to whether steering commit-
tee members act for the interests of their constituent class, or simply
for their own interests. Steering committee members often own sig-
nificant amounts of the issuer's securities, and act collectively to
gain greater influence with the financially troubled firm. Whether
members represent only themselves or other bondholders in negotia-
tions with the distressed company depends upon the understanding
of the parties. Since their actions have consequences for similarly
situated creditors, the distressed company may regard the creditor
steering committee as representing the interests of their constituent
class, or at the very least, serving the "interests of their constituent
[class] by serving their own self-interest."1 8 However, since steering
committees are by definition formed before the issuer has filed for
bankruptcy, the imprimatur of acting for others is not formally pre-
sent; nor is the number and identity of other bondholders necessarily
discernable.
Whether or not steering committee members have fiduciary duties
to their constituent class may best be determined on a case-by-case
basis based on the understanding of the parties. If the committee
purports to act for other bondholders, its members may be bound by
the representation and regarded as fiduciaries of those security hold-
ers. Accordingly, they may breach duties of trust and confidence or
other fiduciary duties to other bondholders if they trade while in
possession of material, nonpublic information obtained through par-
ticipation on the committee. However, if the steering committee por-
trays itself as acting only for the interests of each committee mem-
ber, acts accordingly, and is regarded by the distressed entity as
representing only its own interests, the committee members should
not be characterized as owing fiduciary duties to their constituent
class. In an attempt to define their role, some steering committees
have disclaimed any fiduciary role in their charter. " 9
Since most bondholders would be disinclined to limit their ability
to trade the securities of a financially troubled entity, few steering
committee members would characterize themselves as acting for the
could make any such severance. The character of his fiduciary relation as a committee
member was a continuing status of identic quality throughout, regardless of when the
reorganization proceeding was instituted.
Id. at 5.
148. Brodsky et al., supra note 34, at 594.
149. Wolfson et al., supra note 13, at 193.
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interests of others. In the case of a "pre-packaged" Chapter 11
plan, 50 the failure of the steering committee members to act as fi-
duciaries for their constituent class could hamper or impede the
court's approval of the plan, since unrepresented bondholders could
claim that the plan does not adequately protect their interests. 5 1 To
avoid that predicament, financially distressed companies could re-
quire that the creditors' steering committee affirmatively represent
that they act for their constituent class as a condition to being
recognized.
Should the steering committee represent that it acts for its con-
stituent class to gain greater influence with the financially troubled
entity or if required by the financially distressed company as a req-
uisite to being recognized, the committee should be regarded as ow-
ing duties of trust and confidence or other fiduciary duties to their
constituent class.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duties Owed By Creditors' Committee
Members to the Insolvent Corporation and Its Shareholders
In addition to breaching fiduciary duties owed to their constitu-
ents, the committee itself and to other committee members, mem-
bers of creditors' committees who purchase or sell securities of the
insolvent corporation while in possession of material, nonpublic in-
formation breach duties owed to the insolvent corporation and its
related parties. Historically, courts have held that creditors' com-
mittee members do not owe duties to the insolvent corporation. Nev-
ertheless, members of creditors' committees who are provided confi-
dential information as a consequence of their committee position
may be regarded as "temporary insiders." In an amicus curie
brief' 5 1 filed in the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings involving
150. In a pre-packaged plan, the company (the prospective debtor) negotiates and solicits ac-
ceptance of a reorganization plan prior to filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11.
151. Wolfson et al., supra note 13, at 194.
152. Brief of the SEC, In re Federated Dep't Stores Inc., No. 1-90-00130, 1991 WL 79143
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio January 18, 1991). On January 18, 1991, the SEC filed an amicus brief in
support of the motion by Fidelity Management & Research Co. ("Fidelity") for an order deter-
mining that Fidelity would not violate its fiduciary duties as a member of the Allied's official
bondholders' committee if it traded in the securities of the debtor, provided that Fidelity imple-
mented "information blocking devices" (also referred to as "Chinese Walls") to prevent the com-
munication of inside information between Fidelity's committee representatives and investment per-
sonnel. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted Fidelity's motion
and specified that his ruling was confined to committee members who are "engaged in the trading
of securities as a regular part of their business." Federated Department Stores, at *2, No. 1-90-
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Allied Stores Corp. and Federated Department Stores, Inc., " the
SEC advised that "in a bankruptcy context, the members of an offi-
cial committee are properly viewed as 'temporary insiders' of the
debtor."'14 As such, committee members are subject "to the same
insider trading restrictions as true insiders such as corporate direc-
tors." 66 As "true insiders" they have an obligation to disclose mate-
rial, nonpublic information to shareholders or abstain from trading
on that information.
1. Adverse Interests
Traditionally, courts have ruled that a creditors' committee and
its members owe no duty to the debtor or to the debtor's estate.1 "
For example, in In re Johns-Manville Corp.,"" the court, while ana-
lyzing the obligations of members of an equity committee, generally
noted the duties of bankruptcy committee members, stating:
No doubt, a committee and its members are fiduciaries for each of the par-
ties that it represents. . . .But neither a committee nor its members has
any underlying duty to the debtor or to the estate. Rather, a committee's
only duty is to pursue the interests of its members. That pursuit, together
with the representation of other committees, collectively furthers the reor-
ganization process."
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court, in In re Microboard
Processing, Inc., 59 concluded that a creditors' committee and its
members have a fiduciary duty only to those represented by the
committee. 60 In that case, the debtor sought removal of the two
largest unsecured creditors from the creditors' committee since their
claims were the only claims disputed by the debtor and were dispro-
portionate to all other unsecured debt. 6' The court found that the
unwillingness of the two unsecured creditors to negotiate with the
00130, 1991 WL 79143 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio March 7, 1991) (Order Permitting Securities Trading
in Certain Circumstances). See generally Robert C. Pozen & Judy K. Mencher, Chinese Walls
for Creditors' Committees, 48 Bus. LAW. 747 (1993).
153. Federated Department Stores, No. 1-90-00130, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 392 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Nov. 20, 1992).
154. Brief of the SEC, at 5.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Bohack Corp. v. Gulf W. Indus. Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979).
157. 60 B.R. 842 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
158. Id. at 853-54 n.23.
159. 95 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
160. Id. at 285.
161. Id.
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debtor did not constitute grounds for removal.162 Additionally, the
court found that a fiduciary duty owed by the committee and its
members to the estate would interfere with the duty owed to other
constituents. 163 A member of a creditors' committee that has signifi-
cant contacts with the debtor as an insider may be removed from
the committee. 164 The reasoning employed to remove the debtor-in-
sider highlights the adverse relationship between the debtor and the
committee. In In re Swolsky, 65 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio removed from a creditors' committee a
member whose wife was the office manager, bookkeeper, and vice-
president of the debtor.166 The court stressed the risks to confidenti-
ality of communication among committee members and concluded
that the presence on the committee of either the debtor or his agent
would have a "chilling effect on the other members."' 67
The refusal by the above courts to recognize a fiduciary duty on
162. Id. at 286. The court further stated:
The creditors' committee is not merely a conduit through whom the debtor speaks to
and negotiates with creditors generally. On the contrary, it is purposely intended to
represent the necessarily different interests and concerns of the creditors it represents.
It must necessarily be adversarial in a sense, though its relation with the debtor may
be supportive and friendly.
Id. (quoting In re Daig Corp., 17 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981)).
163. Id.
164. In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 B.R. 941, 944-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing the
removal from the committee of an appointee to the equity committee who also sat on the board of
directors of the debtor); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 919, 925-926 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (stating that individuals constituting a reorganization committee should be honest, loyal,
trustworthy and without conflicting interests and with undivided loyalty and allegiance to their
constituents); In re Glendale Woods Apartments, Ltd., 25 B.R. 414, 415 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982)
(removing creditors for conflict of interests where one creditor's claim was part of agreement to
guarantee debtor's repayment of money owed to the debtor's partners and other creditor's claim
was one personally owed by debtor's managing partner); Daig Corp., 17 B.R. at 42 (removing
creditor as member of committee where its representative and principal operating officer was fa-
ther of chairman of the debtor). Although the Code does not specifically exclude insiders from
committee membership, Bankruptcy Rule 1007(d) excludes insiders from the debtor's list of 20
largest creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1007(d)(1988).
165. 55 B.R. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
166. Id. at 144.
167. Id. at 146. But see In re Nyack Autopartstores Holding Co., 98 B.R. 659 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (refusing to revoke a Chapter 11 confirmation order because complaint did not particularize
any fraudulent conduct on part of corporate debtors even though the committee chairman was a
cousin of the debtor's principal operating officer); In re Vermont Real Estate Invest. Trust, 20
B.R. 33 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (refusing to deny committee membership to the wife of the former
executive officer of the debtor who was also a co-defendant with her husband in a lawsuit alleging
fraudulent involvement in certain of the debtor's prior activities. However, the court required her
to refrain from participating in any committee discussions regarding her lawsuit against the
debtor).
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the part of the committee or its members to the debtor does not
thwart the application of the temporary insider theory. None of the
above decisions concerned the issue of trading on inside information.
The decisions focused instead on the obligations of committee mem-
bers to their constituents and other members of the commmittee.
Those obligations were found to be inconsistent with owing any du-
ties to the debtor. Further, courts have recognized that a confiden-
tial relationship may exist between two parties operating at arms
length."68 The circumstances of the relationship between an outsider
and the corporation are more important than initial assumptions
concerning the outsider's position in relation to the corporation.16 9
2. Temporary Insiders
a. In re Cady, Roberts & Co.1 "
Traditional corporate insiders include officers, directors and con-
trolling shareholders. However, the Commission in In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co."' stated that these three groups "do not exhaust the
class of persons upon whom there is such an obligation. 1 72 Rather,
the Commission held that the obligation to disclose material, non-
public information to shareholders or to abstain from trading
requires:
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose . . . and the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.l""
b. Dirks v. SEC, Footnote 14
At Footnote 14 of its opinion in Dirks v. SEC,74 the Supreme
168. See Smith v. Dravo, 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953). For a discussion of Smith, see infra
notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
169. See SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). For a discussion of Lund. see
infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
170. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1967).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 912.
173. Id. (stating that the scope of the disclose or abstain rule is not "circumscribed by fine
distinctions and rigid classifications." Rather, the prohibition against insider trading is directed at
"those persons who are in a special relationship with the company and privy to its internal
affairs").
174. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Court recognized the existence of "temporary insiders.' ' 5  The
Court stated that individuals who have a special confidential rela-
tionship with the corporate issuer or insider, and who are given in-
formation for legitimate corporate purposes with the expectation
that such information be kept confidential and used only for legiti-
mate corporate purposes, may be characterized as "temporary insid-
ers."' 76 The Court added: "for such a duty to be imposed, however,
the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed non-
public information confidential, and the relationship must at least
imply such a duty."' 7 Footnote 14 specifies certain persons that
may be determined to be temporary insiders, namely underwriters,
accountants, lawyers and consultants, but the language in footnote
14 does not limit the application of the doctrine to those persons. 7 8
c. Judicial Interpretation of Footnote 14
In the first case to apply footnote 14 of Dirks, the court in SEC v.
Lund179 determined that the circumstances of a relationship may
imply an obligation to keep certain information confidential. In that
case, Horowitz, the Chief Executive Officer and President of P&F
Industries, Inc. ("P&F"), told Lund, a long-time friend and a direc-
tor of Verit Industries ("Verit"), about negotiations between P&F
and another entity concerning a joint venture and asked if Verit
would be interested in providing a capital investment for the ven-
ture. 80 After the conversation, Lund purchased P&F securities, his
only purchase of P&F securities in ten years.' 8'
175. In footnote 14, the Court notes,
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legiti-
mately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corpora-
tion, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recog-
nizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate
information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship
in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes. When such a person breaches his fiduciary relationship,
he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. For such a duty to be
imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed non-
public information confidential, and the relationship must at least imply such a duty.
Id. at 655 n.14 (citations omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
180. Id. at 1400.
181. Id.
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The district court found that Lund violated section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.'1 2 The Court determined that Lund was a temporary
P&F insider when he traded on the basis of the information con-
cerning the proposed joint venture.1 s The court underscored the
special relationship between Horowitz and Lund, noting that they
were long-time friends who had often exchanged private corporate
information,18 4 and concluded that Horowitz told Lund about the
joint venture because of this special relationship." 5 The court fur-
ther found that the relationship between Horowitz and Lund was
such as to imply that the information was to be kept confidential.18 6
The court concluded, "[u]nder these circumstances, Lund became a
temporary P&F insider upon receipt of the information concerning
the [joint venture] and assumed an insider's duty to 'disclose or ab-
stain' from trading based on that information. 1
87
Following Lund, other courts have recognized as temporary insid-
ers a number of individuals with close affinity to the issuer or corpo-
rate insiders. 8 In SEC v. Gaspar,89 Gaspar, an employee of a bro-
kerage firm, represented Dyson-Kisser-Moran's Corp. ("DKM")
regarding acquisition by DKM of the holdings of Emory Clark and
his family in Clark Oil and Refining Corp ("Clark Oil")."1 90 In
connection with his representation of DKM, Gaspar learned of
DKM's interest in making a tender offer for Clark Oil's outstanding
shares, and tipped the information to a friend.191
The trial court found that Gaspar owed fiduciary duties of hon-
182. Id. at 1403.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("The information was made available to Lund solely for corporate purposes. It was
not disclosed in idle conversation or for some other purpose.").
186. Id. ("Horowitz clearly did not expect Lund to make the. information public or to use the
information for his personal gain. Lund knew or should have known that the information he re-
ceived was confidential and that it had been disclosed to him solely for legitimate corporate
purposes.").
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. See SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 439-40 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) (characterizing manager
of a law firm's office services department as a temporary insider); see also United States v. Victor
Teicher & Co., L.P., 785 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying temporary insider status to
member of investment firm that had access to "phantom list" containing the names of the compa-
nies that firm was not to trade in because of firm's involvement in transactions relating to them),
affd, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993).
189. 11984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004, at 90,967 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 15, 1985).
190. Id. at 90,969.
191. Id. at 90,975.
19941
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
esty and loyalty to the brokerage firm. 92 Furthermore, since Gaspar
represented DKM on behalf of the brokerage firm during the course
of DKM's secret negotiations with Emory Clark, the court con-
cluded that Gaspar was a "temporary insider" of DKM with a fidu-
ciary duty to that corporation. 193 Quoting Dirks, the court stated
that under certain circumstances, outsiders may become fiduciaries:
"[the basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that
they acquired nonpublic information, but rather that they have en-
tered into a special relationship in the conduct of the business of the
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate
purposes." '94
Additionally, in SEC v. Tome,' an informal, financial consultant
to Joseph E. Seagram & Co. ("Seagram") learned from the chief
executive officer that Seagram intended to announce a hostile tender
offer for St. Joe Minerals Corp. and traded on the information. 96
The court noted that "[t]he relationship between the management
of a corporation and its financial advisors and consultants regarding
prospective hostile tender offers is inherently one which implies a
duty of confidentiality."' 97 Thus, even though Tome was not a cor-
porate officer or director, he was found to have owed a fiduciary
duty to Seagram with respect to the information. 98
Three years before the Supreme Court espoused the temporary
insider doctrine in Dirks, the Second Circuit in Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc.'99 declined to recognize a duty of confidentiality
absent prescribed duties and obligations concerning the receipt of
confidential information. 0 In Walton, Morgan Stanley, an invest-
ment banking and financial advisory firm, was retained by Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. ("Kennecott") to find a company that Kennecott
could acquire.20 One of the companies it considered acquiring,
Olinkraft, cooperated with Morgan Stanley by providing confiden-
192. Id. at 90,978.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)).
195. 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
196. Id. at 599.
197. Id. at 621.
198. Id. at 622; see also SEC v. Downe, No. 92 Civ. 4092, 1993 WL 22126 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
1993)(characterizing the head of an investor group seeking to gain control of Bally Manufactur-
ing Co. as a "confidential adviser" to Bally and found to be a "temporary insider").
199. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
200. Id. at 799.
201. Id. at 797.
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tial internal earnings projections and instructed that the nonpublic
information was to be used in connection with the Kennecott bid
and was to be returned to Olinkraft if such bid did not occur. 202 A
year after Kennecott's acquisition plans were abandoned, Texas
Eastern Corp. made a bid to acquire Kennecott2 03 After the an-
nouncement, Morgan Stanley purchased a substantial amount of
Olinkraft stock. Following the purchases, Morgan Stanley shared
the confidential information it had received with Johns-Manville, an
entity it was advising, to encourage Johns-Manville to make a sub-
stantially higher offer than made by Texas Eastern Corp. 0'
Morgan Stanley denied having a fiduciary relationship with Olin-
kraft.2 05 The Second Circuit sided with Morgan Stanley, noting that
Morgan Stanley's client was Kennecott, not Olinkraft.2 06 The court
determined that Morgan Stanley had no duty to act on Olinkraft's
behalf.2 07 Furthermore, the court refused to embrace Olinkraft's ar-
gument that Morgan Stanley became a fiduciary of Olinkraft by
virtue of the receipt of the confidential information:
[tihe fact that the information was confidential did nothing, in and of itself,
to change the relationship between Morgan Stanley and Olinkraft's manage-
ment. Put bluntly, although, according to the complaint, Olinkraft's man-
agement placed its confidence in Morgan Stanley not to disclose the infor-
mation, Morgan Stanley owed no duty to observe that confidence .28
Unlike the court in Lund,20 9 the court in Walton did not consider
the circumstances of the relationship between Morgan Stanley and
Olinkraft. The court did recognize the predicament faced by Olin-
kraft, a potential target which may have been required by its re-
sponsibility to the shareholders to disclose confidential information
to a potential acquiror.2 10 However, instead of recognizing that
Morgan Stanley could have an implied duty of confidentiality to
Olinkraft, the court only identified the duty to the legally-retained
client. The court concluded that the relationship between Morgan
Stanley and Olinkraft was adverse and incapable of supporting a
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 789.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 798 ("Morgan Stanley and Olinkraft's management must be presumed to have
dealt, absent evidence of an extraordinary relationship, at arm's length.").
208. Id. at 799.
209. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
210. Walton, 623 F.2d at 799.
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claim of a fiduciary relationship."'
The court noted the absence of an agreement or understanding
concerning the confidentiality of information provided to Morgan
Stanley.212 It is unclear from the court's opinion, however, whether
a clear agreement or understanding concerning the confidential fi-
nancial information would have made Morgan Stanley's trading
actionable.1
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oakes contended that Morgan
Stanley's acceptance of the information on confidential terms cre-
ated an implied obligation to respect the confidentiality of the infor-
mation.21 4 Judge Oakes explained that, although Morgan Stanley
did not owe a duty to Olinkraft or its shareholders when it first ap-
proached Olinkraft, once Olinkraft began to cooperate in the deal
by turning over confidential financial information, "the acceptance
of such information by Morgan Stanley, on the confidential terms,
along with its understood role as intermediary in a cooperative take-
over, imposed a duty on the investment banker under well-estab-
lished common law principles not to use that information for its own
profit. 216
Unlike the decision in Walton, the court in Smith v. Dravo
Corp.2" determined that a confidential relationship existed between
two parties engaged in an arm's length transaction. In that case,
Smith, a builder of shipping containers, provided detailed confiden-
tial information concerning its business operations to Dravo. After
the two parties failed to agree on a sale price, negotiations between
the two companies were terminated. Dravo than constructed its own
shipping containers that were very similar to Smith's. Although
Dravo made no express promise to preserve the confidentiality of the
information, 17 the court, nonetheless, found a promise of confidenti-
211. Id.
212. Id. ("But that obligation, while it burdens management, which might therefore reasonably
insist upon an agreement of confidentiality, does not change the relationship between the target
and the acquiror or its advisor. Appellants' complaint alleges no such agreement or
understanding.").
213. Normally, creditors' committees execute a confidentiality agreement prior to receiving
confidential information from the debtor.
214. Walton, 623 F.2d at 801 (Oakes, J. dissenting)(emphasis in original); see Gregory R.
Andre, Note, Constructive Insider Liability and the Arm's Length Transaction Under Footnote
Fourteen of Dirks, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 872, 884 (1984).
215. Walton, 623 F.2d at 801.
216. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
217. Id. at 376.
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ality implied from the relationship of the parties.21 The court noted
that the information was provided for "one purpose, to enable de-
fendant to appraise it with a view in mind of purchasing the busi-
ness. Trust was reposed in it by plaintiffs that the information thus
transmitted would be accepted subject to the limitation."219 The
court was unswayed by the arm's-length nature of the transaction
stating, "the implied limitation on the use to be made of the infor-
mation had its roots in the 'arm's-length' transaction. 220
The impact of Walton on the question of the liability of creditors
committee members is dubious. Had Walton been decided using the
analysis outlined in Dirks, the court could have found an implied
duty of confidentiality, and thus, treated Morgan Stanley as a tem-
porary insider. First, the corporation expected and specifically re-
quested Morga Stanley to keep the information confidential. Sec-
ond, Morgan Stanley's conduct in accepting the information and not
divulging it or acting upon it during the course of the negotiations,
at least suggests that some type of confidential relationship exist. 2 '
Moreover, the relationship between creditors' committee members
and the debtor corporation is different from that of Morgan Stanley
and Olinkraft. Creditors committee members and the debtor corpo-
ration have a relationship prior to and in addition to the disclosure
of the confidential information. In contrast, Morgan Stanley and
Olinkraft's only association was the disclosure of the confidential in-
formation. The relationship between the creditors' committee mem-
bers and the corporation is more akin to the relationship in Lund.
3. Application of Footnote 14
a. Official Creditors' Committee
Dirks specified a two-part test for determining when an outsider
may be characterized as a temporary insider: first, the existence of
"a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of
the enterprise" in which the outsider is "given access to information
solely for corporate purposes;" and second, "the corporation must
expect the outsider to keep the nonpublic information confidential
and the relationship must imply such a duty. 22 2
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 377.
221. See Andre, supra note 214, at 884.
222. 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983); see supra texts accompanying notes 174-78.
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The debtor and the creditors' committee enter into a "special con-
fidential relationship" to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor
corporation. To achieve this objective, committee members are given
access to confidential information. Committee members receive the
information as a consequence of their expansive investigative pow-
ers. 2 3 The power of creditors' committees to fully investigate the
debtor and its business affairs is defined by the Bankruptcy Code
and is judicially recognized.2
Also, the debtor expects creditors' committee members to keep
the information confidential and the relationship implies such a
duty. Generally, committee members are required to sign confidenti-
ality agreements as a condition to receiving confidential corporate
information. 25 Under the agreements, the debtor's intent to keep
the information confidential is clear. However, even when a debtor
does not require committee members to execute confidentiality
agreements, the receipt alone of confidential information carries
with it the obligation that the information be kept confidential.2 26
Moreover, the use of the confidential information for personal gain
is an apparent abuse of the confidence.
b. Creditor Steering Committees
Unlike official creditors' committees, which are specifically au-
thorized to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor,227 creditor
steering committees have no defined right to receive or review confi-
dential information concerning the financial affairs of the financially
troubled company. Nevertheless, members of creditor steering com-
mittees, like official creditors' committees, appear to come within
the temporary insider definition articulated in Dirks228 - individu-
als who have a special confidential relationship with the corporate
223. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
225. See Wolfson et al., supra note 13, at 186.
226. See supra note 217 and accompanying text; see also Andre, supra note 214, at 885
("Footnote 14 of Dirks does not call for an express bi-lateral agreement, but states that the terms
of the relationship must imply a duty to maintain confidentiality. The footnote focuses concern on
the expectations of the insider, not the outsider, and looks to whether a duty can be implied, not
where the outsider expressly agreed to be bound.") (citations omitted.)
227. See II U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (1988) (detailing member responsibilities and committees es-
tablished under 11 U.S.C. § 1102, the section entitled "Creditors and Equity Security Holders
Committees").
228. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). For a discussion of Dirks, see supra notes 174-78
and accompanying text.
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issuer or insider and who are given information for legitimate corpo-
rate purposes with the expectation that such information be kept
confidential and used only for legitimate corporate purposes. 2 9
Providing confidential information to a creditor steering commit-
tee does not alone establish a relationship of trust and confidence
between the distressed entity and the members of the committee. 30
However, the primary reason that a distressed entity would provide
a creditor steering committee with confidential corporate informa-
tion would be to further the interests of the entity, such as to ap-
prise creditors of inadequate cash flow in hopes of modifying the
terms of indenture agreement or other obligations. Those circum-
stances suggest the existence of a special relationship of trust and
confidence.23 1 Although the reasoning is admittedly circular, steer-
ing committee members would be hard pressed to deny the existence
of a special confidential relationship where they alone received confi-
dential information. Moreover, the existence of a confidentiality
agreement would likely fortify the contention that a special confi-
dential relationship existed between the distressed entity and the
steering committee.
4. Application of the Misappropriation Theory
Members of official and unofficial creditors' committees who are
determined to owe fiduciary duties to the insolvent corporation may
be liable for trading on material, nonpublic information either as
insiders, under the temporary insider theory, or under the misappro-
priation theory. Both the temporary insider theory and the misap-
propriation theory are premised on the existence of a relationship of
trust and confidence between the outsider and the corporation. 32
Members of creditors' committees who misappropriate material,
nonpublic information received from the corporation, or as a result
229. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
230. See SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that an expecta-
tion of confidentiality does not in itself, create a fiduciary relationship). "[T]here must be some
sort of special relationship from which an objective person would conclude that a confidential
relationship exists." Id.
231. See SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 92,004, at
90,978 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985) (finding a "special relationship" and fiduciary duty where per-
sons are given access to information solely for corporate purposes).
232. Barbara Rudolf, Note, Subjective Evaluations of Technology as Bases for Rule JOb-5
Securities Law Violations: Liability for Scientific Consultants, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1856,
1884 ("there is no practical difference between the [temporary insider and the misappropriation]
theories where the duty owed by the outsider runs to the issuing corporation.").
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of their membership on the committee, and who trade on the infor-
mation exploit the trust and confidence of the corporation. Conse-
quently, they breach a duty to the corporation and may be liable
under Rule lOb-5.
C. Liability of Committee Members for Trading in Debt
Securities
As temporary insiders of the insolvent corporation, members of
creditors' committees owe fiduciary duties to the corporation's
shareholders. Committee members who trade in the equity securi-
ties of the debtor corporation while in possession of inside informa-
tion breach duties owed to shareholders. Traditionally, however,
neither the issuer nor its insiders have owed fiduciary duties to
debtholders. By its language, footnote 14 of Dirks is limited to ex-
plaining how "outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. 233
At first glance, trading by committee members in the debt securi-
ties of the debtor would not be actionable because committee mem-
bers breach no duties to shareholders as a result of the trading. Lia-
bility may, however, be premised on: (1) the ruling in Pepper v.
Litton214 which expands the insider's duties to creditors when the
corporation is insolvent; and (2) the misappropriation theory and
breach of duties owed to the corporation.
1. Traditional View
Corporations and their insiders traditionally have been found to
owe no fiduciary duties to the holders of the corporation's debt se-
curities.23 5 Under corporate law, the rights of bondholders are gov-
233. 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
234. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
235. See Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 786 (Del. Ch. 1987) (noting that "[i]t has now
become firmly fixed in our law" that insiders do not owe the corporation's bondholders any "duty
of the broad and exacting nature characterized as a fiduciary duty"), affd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988); Lorenz v. CSX Corp. [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,689, at
97,204 (3d. Cir. Aug. 6, 1993) (stating that "It is well-established that a corporation does not
have a fiduciary relationship with its debt security holders, as with its shareholders. The relation-
ship between a corporation and its debtholders is contractual in nature"). But see SEC v. Karcher,
Litigation Release No. 11,702, 40 SEC 950 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1988)(ruling that a fast food
restaurant executive violated section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 when he sold his company's debentures
before disclosing negative earnings). Although the court's ruling logically requires a finding that
the executive owed a fiduciary obligation to the purchasers of the debentures, the issue was never
explicitly addressed by the parties or the court. Id.; see Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 68, at
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erned exclusively by the terms of the bond contract.3 6 In Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,8 7 the Delaware Su-
preme Court determined that the Revlon directors breached a duty
of loyalty to their shareholders by entering into a lock-up agreement
that favored debtholders at the expense of shareholders." 8 The
court reasoned that, unlike equity holders, the rights of the
debtholders were merely contractual - governed by the
indenture.23 9
The lack of a fiduciary relationship between an issuer and its
debtholders was also determinative in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
RJR Nabisco, Inc.240  In that case, bondholders brought action
against RJR Nabisco ("RJR") to recover the loss of value of the
corporation's bonds following a leveraged buyout.24' RJR countered
by arguing that the express provisions of the bond indentures per-
mitted mergers and the incurrence of additional debt.242 Concluding
that the company and its bondholders "do not stand in a fiduciary
relationship with one another, ' 2 3 the district court restricted its
analysis to contract law and ruled in favor of RJR.244
236-37.
236. Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Del. 1986) ("The rights of debenture
holders are controlled by the terms of the indenture under which the securities are issued.");
Lorenz, at 97,204.
237. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
238. Id. at 179 (referring to waiver of the notes causing decrease in value).
239. Id. at 182 (citing Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72, 75 (Del. 1969)); see
also Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. 1974) (finding that the holders of convertible
subordinate debentures had no standing to maintain a derivative action as no fiduciary duty ex-
isted and that the rights of the debenture holders were confined to the terms of the indenture
agreement, in absence of fraud, insolvency, or violation of statute).
240. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
241. Id. at 1506.
242. Id. at 1508.
243. Id. at 1522. The court eventually found Delaware law to be persuasive. Quoting from a
Delaware Supreme Court decision, the court stated that:
a corporate bond 'represents a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a debt and
does not represent an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the
imposition of a trust relationship with concomitant fiduciary duties.' Before such a
fiduciary duty arises 'an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a
duty must exist.' A bondholder, the court concluded, 'acquires no equitable interest,
and remains a creditor of the corporation whose interests are protected by the con-
tractual terms of the indenture.'
Id. at 1524 (quoting Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988)).
244. Id. at 1508 (The court declined to "create an indenture term that, while bargained for in
other contexts, was not bargained for here and was not even within the mutual contemplation of
the parties").
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Also, the Supreme Court of Delaware in Simons v. Cogan,24 5 re-
fused to recognize a fiduciary duty to holders of convertible deben-
tures, even though the convertible debenture may be converted into
equity. 46 In that case, the court stated that "[a] convertible deben-
ture represents a contractual entitlement to the payment of a debt
and does not represent an equitable interest in the issuing corpora-
tion necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with con-
comitant fiduciary duties. ' 47
In contrast, the court in In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Liti-
gation,14 '8 recognized a fiduciary duty between insiders and converti-
ble debenture holders. In that case, convertible debenture holders
were granted standing to bring an insider trading action based on
the defendants' sales of Worlds of Wonder ("WOW") stock shortly
before WOW filed for bankruptcy. 149 The debenture purchasers
claimed that they were induced to purchase debentures at artifi-
cially inflated prices because WOW allegedly suppressed material,
adverse information. 50 The court held that convertible debenture
holders have a "relationship of trust and confidence" with corporate
insiders. 1 Citing Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.
Co.,252 the court further held that debenture and stock purchasers
have the same functional relationship to the corporation:
Both invest capital into the corporation, and both contribute to its ability to
attract equity. Both rely on the corporation to keep them apprised of its
affairs, and both are justified in presuming that corporate insiders are not
abusing their position by profiting from undisclosed corporate information.
By analogy, then, WOW insiders have a 'fiduciary duty' to debenture pur-
chasers, and the Defendants as tippees can be liable to the Debenture Sub-
class for trading on the basis of a tip that violated the tippers' fiduciary
duty.2
53
245. 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
246. Id. at 304.
247. Id. at 303.
248. [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,689, at 98,235 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 1990).
249. Id. at 98,236.
250. Id. at 98,237.
251. Id. at 98,239.
252. 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir. 1982) (permitting convertible debenture holders to sue the
corporation for nondisclosure of dividend under Rule lob-5 because "directors must act as fiducia-
ries to all equity participants," including holders of securities containing stock options), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). "Debenture purchasers as well as stock purchasers have the 'fiduci-
ary' relationship to corporate insiders and their tippees that the Supreme Court has required in
Chiarella and Dirks for standing under Rule 10b-." Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., at 98,239 n.6.
253. Id; see also Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 163-164 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
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Therefore, under the traditional rule alone, members of creditors'
committees who are found to be temporary insiders, still could be
free to trade in the debt securities of the financially distressed cor-
poration, with the possible exception of convertible debentures, with-
out violating the federal securities laws.
2. Pepper v. Litton54
However, in Pepper v. Litton,255 the Supreme Court recognized
an exception to the traditional rule and found that a fiduciary duty
does exist between insiders and debtholders of the corporation when
the corporation is insolvent - the raison d'etre of the creditors'
committee. 56 In Pepper, an insider of an insolvent corporation satis-
fied a wage claim of his own separate one-man corporation over the
claims of other creditors.25 The Supreme Court denied the insider's
claim.258 Justice Douglas indicated that the traditional relationship
between corporate insiders and creditors changes when the corpora-
tion becomes insolvent, 59 thus creating a duty.2 60 He stated that in
the context of an insolvent corporation, the insider's "fiduciary obli-
gation is designed for the protection of the entire community of in-
(holding option traders had standing to sue corporate insiders who traded options while in posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information, because the duty to disclose or abstain from trading is
owed "not only to the shareholders of the corporate employer but also to the investing public at
large"). But see Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding that the relationship between the corporation and the option holder did not constitute a
relationship of trust and confidence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983). "Plaintiff is not trading
with the insider or the insider's company. He has bought no interest in it. He is a member of the
investing public but he is not investing in the defendant's company." Id. at 413.
254. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 307.
257. Id. at 299.
258. Id. at 313.
259. The shift of fiduciary obligations takes place when the corporation is "at or near insol-
vency." Note, Insider Trading in Junk Bonds, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1732; see Credit Lyon-
nais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. WL 277613 *34 (stat-
ing that the directors' duty changes when a corporation operates in the "vicinity of insolvency.")
260. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 310-11. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 68 at 231 (relating the
formation of the duty to the "trust fund doctrine"); see also Automatic Canteen Co. of America,
358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that directors of the debtor's insolvent subsidiary cor-
poration were trustees of the corporate assets for the benefit of the creditors). The court reasoned
that directors of an insolvent corporation "occupy a fiduciary position towards the creditors, just
as they do toward the corporation when it is solvent." Id.; see Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty
Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1485, 1524 (1993) (stating that "upon insolvency the directors become 'trustees' for the creditors
and hold corporate assets as a 'trust fund' for the creditors.").
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terests in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders. ' 2 1
Although temporary insiders owe duties to shareholders, under
the ruling in Pepper members of official (and possibly unofficial)2 62
creditors' committee members also owe duties to other creditors, in-
cluding creditors who are not members of the class represented by
the committee member. Accordingly, members of official (and possi-
bly unofficial) creditors' committees determined to be temporary in-
siders of the debtor breach duties to all creditors when they trade in
the debtor corporation's debt securities while in possession of confi-
dential information.
3. Misappropriation Theory
Members of creditors' committees may also be liable under the
misappropriation theory for trading in the debt securities of the in-
solvent corporation. Although as temporary insiders, the members
may not owe a duty to the bondholders of the corporation (absent
the ruling in Pepper), they do owe a general fiduciary duty to the
debtor corporation and its shareholders to "preserve the confidenti-
ality of nonpublic information that belongs to and emanates from
the corporation. ' 263 Accordingly, committee members who trade in
the debt securities of the insolvent corporation on the basis of confi-
dential information breach a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation
and may violate Rule lOb-5. To establish the member's liability, the
government does not have to prove that members breached any du-
ties to the shareholders of the corporation.2 6
CONCLUSION
Members of creditors' committees and creditor steering commit-
tees who purchase or sell, or tip others to purchase or sell, securities
of insolvent or financially distressed corporations while in possession
261. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. 716 F.
Supp. 1504, 1524 n.33 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[I]f the Court here were confronted with an insolvent
corporation, which is not the case, the company's officers and directors might become trustees of
its assets for the protection of its creditors, among others."); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215,
222 (Del. Ch. 1974) (stating that insiders might owe duties in addition to those specified in the
indenture in the event of "fraud, insolvency or violation of statute."); afl'd in part and rev'd on
other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
262. The expanded obligations of insiders imposed by Pepper may apply to steering committee
members. See supra note 259.
263. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024
(1984).
264. See United States v. Newman, 654 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
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of material, nonpublic information may violate the federal securities
laws pursuant to two theories.
First, committee members may owe fiduciary duties to their con-
stituents, the committee itself and fellow committee members. Com-
mittee members who breach these duties by fraudulently misappro-
priating confidential information violate Rule lOb-5. In the case of
official creditors' committees, it is well established that committee
members owe a fiducuiary duty to those they represent. Since the
misappropriation of inside information would tarnish the reputation
of the committee and reflect poorly on fellow committee members,
committee members may also owe duties to the committee itself and
other committee members. Members of creditors' committees who
misappropriate material, nonpublic information in breach of duties
to their constituents, the committee itself and to other committee
members, violate Rule 1Ob-5 regardless of whether they owe any
duties to the shareholders of the traded securities.
Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Code, committee members
were found to be fiduciaries to their constituent class. By analogy, it
can be argued that creditor steering committees act as fiduciaries to
their constituent class. Whether steering committee members act for
the interests of their constituent class, or simply for their own inter-
ests, is best answered on a case-by-case basis.
Second, members of official and unofficial creditors' committees
who are determined to owe fiduciary duties to the debtor corpora-
tion may be liable for trading on material, nonpublic information
either as insiders, under the temporary insider theory, or the misap-
propriation theory. Committee members may be characterized as
"temporary insiders," and as such, are subject to the same insider
trading restrictions as "true insiders" such as directors, officers and
shareholders. Traditionally, courts have ruled that creditors' com-
mittee members owe no duty to the debtor corporation. However,
courts' have also recognized that a confidential relationship may ex-
ist between parties pursuing different interests. Debtors and credi-
tors' committee members enter into such a relationship to facilitate
the reorganization of the debtor. To acheive this objective, commit-
tee members are given access to confidential information as a conse-
quence of their expansive investigative powers. Further, the debtor
expects creditors' committee members to keep the information se-
cret, and the relationship implies such a duty.
Unlike official creditors' committee members, which are specifi-
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cally authorized to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor,
creditor steeering committees have no defined right to receive or re-
view confidential information concerning the financial affairs of the
financially troubled company. Nevertheless, members of creditor
steering committees, like official creditors' committees, appear to
come within the temporary insider definition articulated in Dirks.2 65
While the transfer alone of confidential information to the creditor
steering committee does not establish a relationship of trust and
confidence between the distressed entity and the members of the
committee, the additional circumstances surrounding the dealings
between the parties suggest the existence of a confidential
relationship.
Finally, although insiders generally do not owe duties to
debtholders of the corporation, official and unofficial committee
members characterized as temporary insiders may, nonetheless, be
liable for trading in the debt securities of the insolvent corporation.
As temporary insiders of the insolvent corporation, members of offi-
cial (and possibly unofficial) creditors' committees who trade in the
corporation's debt securities while in possession of inside informa-
tion, breach duties to all other creditors pursuant to the holding in
Pepper. Committee members who misappropriate and trade in the
debt securities of the insolvent corporation based on confidential cor-
porate information breach duties owed to the corporation and may
also violate Rule lOb-5.
265. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 665 n.14 (1983) (describing temporary insider).
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